I had some thoughts spinning around in my head about the UCAS-N thing for the U.S. Navy and the fact that I gave them the benefit of the doubt.
While my background is mostly USAF, I have worked with the Navy before and like them. And, given a variety of problems, I think they are getting better every day. Today, the U.S. carrier air wing has lot more strike power than it ever has in the past. That is assuming it doesn't face a first team air power. Every fighter on the deck can drop cheap sub 2 meter precision guided munitions (PGMs) in near any weather. After large enemy surface-to-air missile (SAM) and fighter aircraft threats are killed off in the first nights of an air war, NOTHING can hurt today's Navy fighter jets during a bombing party. Since one PGM is more times than not, one hit, the magazine space of the carrier can can allow the strike planners the ability to frag a long menu of targets. This wasn't the case in Allied Force 1999. Today, a mission dropping a stick of dumb iron, is a wasted mission.
After reading this at I.D. , I think I have even more thoughts to put down. This slot was mostly going to be about how the U.S. Air Force should sign on with the UCAS-N program as a joint effort or risk being minimized when it comes time to spool up a big air plan. More on that at another time.
Today, the U.S. Navy has to keep recapitalizing the flight deck with more Super Hornets. With ops tempo as it is, the classic Hornets are running out of life at a faster rate and well, old Super Hornet procurement plans when it was sold to Congress years ago, showed that the U.S. Navy would be well on their way to getting the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) by now. Of course typical with the over-sell of the JSF program to Congress, this isn't going to happen for a while. If one has any sense, they should consider the Boeing sales effort to populate more Super Hornets on the deck as a necessity. There is no other current available technology to replace the Navy's aging fighter force. I'll even add the words "low-risk" to that for the corporate and pentagon group-thinkers.
OK, so that gets done and then what's next? Here the U.S. Navy seems a bit confused. It appears that a pilot mafia_like effort is gunning to have a new manned carrier jet designed. This idea is the F/A-XX. This plan is to choose an aircraft design and give it the ability of a manned and unmanned variant. While there may be some practical reasons like airframe commonality, the U.S. Navy already has a good road map for the flight deck. Does one really think F/A-XX is good for adding power to future carrier air wings? After all, if UCAS-N carrier quals, it will be a leap ahead in strike power for the fleet and not just for ISR/ISTAR missions.
First, the U.S. Navy has ship building problems with hair on them. It has very limited money to spend on it's good efforts toward modernization. Justifying F/A-XX as some kind of replacement program for the Hornet community needs some serious Congressional examination. The U.S. Navy has already planned for a new generation manned fighter for the carrier. That is the job of the upcoming F-35C JSF. Where would the U.S. Navy find funds for the F/A-XX?
With the Super Hornet, the taxpayer gets a two-engine jet that with one engine faulty, can get the crew back on deck. The U.S. Navy has a strong believe in two-aircrew for attack. The Block II F Super has a lot of value tied into it. Remember here that when the Navy was negotiating on the specs for the Joint Strike Fighter years ago they wanted: 2 aircrew, 2 engines, 1000 mile radius. Here Super Hornet wins 2 out of 3.
Next, assuming the F-35C effort doesn't fail terribly, you will have good nose-on VLO stealth and a 600 mile radius from the deck. While not an airplane, you have the Tomahawk Block IV cruise missile in quantity from the fleet to help in first nights of the war beat-downs. What the Block IV has shown is some great UCAS-N_like ability. Anyone not trusting UCAS-N for strike work shouldn't trust a Block IV Tomahawk. This cruise missile can loiter and be retargeted after launch should the target go stale or move.
The other end of the manned fighter issue with the U.S. Navy is that you can only expect to get 10 hours or so out of the cockpit worker. I hope the Navy isn't expecting super-sonic performance out of their manned variant of the F/A-XX. Otherwise the engine and fuel consumption requirements means it will never see range that is much different than the F-35C (what ever that ends up being after CAIV). If no other service signs on for F/A-XX, this program could end up with a few of the A-12 anchors hanging around it's neck just for the sake of nostalgia. In comparison the max weight on the F-35C is looking at 70,000lbs. So then if it is going to have great range, does this mean the F/A-XX is subsonic? And is that what one wants for the manned variant of F/A-XX? If so, that brings up other issues like the bad idea of leaving a pilot hanging in the wind in a high threat area with limited performance in a negative stealth event.
One U.S. Navy carrier road map looks like this:
-Super Hornet Block II out to 2024-30
-F-35C
-UCAS-N
If two aircrew attack is so important to the Navy, keep building Super Hornets. Again it is doubtful that every air campaign has threats that are first team stuff. If two aircrew attack becomes less important by the time Super Hornets leave the fleet around 2030, then, keep the fighter population for the carrier air wing a mix of F-35s and UCAS-N. Here too UCAS-N will be a tanker and an ASW platform to boot.
All of that with assist from Tomahawk IV and maybe someday: The problematic JASSM. Also of mention are the mature SLAM-ER and JSOW.
To really appreciate the strike power of the above items, match up their strike range and PGM hitting ability against past bombing campaigns like Allied Force, OEF 2001, OIF 2003 etc. Look at the impact of the UCAS-N unrefueled 1400-1500 mile radius. Showing up with this kind of power means that for a big air campaign, the Navy can do most of the hitting. Any manned effort will never deliver the unrefueled range, persistence and loiter that UCAS-N offers the carrier air wing.
Besides any fighter-mafia-protection-as-a-reason jibes, the only other reason for F/A-XX is that the Navy is stating in plain language that: The carrier variant of the F-35 JSF is high risk and we need a backup plan."
The U.S. taxpayer has been told time and again with what seems unlimited hype that the F-35 JSF is the future manned affordable fighter for all services. Along with UCAS-N, the Navy already has a plan for the manned and unmanned carrier strike jet team. Given all of the other things the Navy has to pay for to run the show, F/A-XX is unjustified.
Wednesday, June 25, 2008
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11 comments:
Maybe, just maybe, the USN has realized that, to remain relevant in air-to-air combat of the 21st century, they need a better interceptor.
Maybe the past few years of Top Gun with F-18E/F has convinced the CAGs that they can't make up for the Super Hornet's performance deficiencies with pilot skill.
I agree with jimmy... One has to remember that before there were sold the JSF (reluctantly), the Navy wanted to go for a navalized version of the Raptor. Given the "first in" nature of carrier operations, and the long distances implied in, say, PACRIM air warfare, the Navy may not want to have to wait for the Air Force F/A-22 to have a decent air-to-air capability. UCAV are not gonna give that capability, and neither is the F-35.
Following my previous comment, my proposal for a future carrier air group would be :
- 20-30 manned F/A-XX, with air superiority/fleet defense/first night of the war missions (F/A-22-like aircraft, optimized for fleet needs)
- 40+ N-UCAS with ISR/Recce/Strike missions, to support both F/A-XX and ASW aircraft
- 10+ ASW aircraft, to replace the S-3Bs
- 4-8 AEW/C4ISR aircrafts
- 10+ SAED aircrafts
- 10+ helos for ASW, CSAR, etc.
for a grand total of around 120 aircrafts max, the max capacity of a Nimitz-class carrier. Such an ideal air group would give back to the USN the ASW potency of the carriers, and a real capability against a modern enemy air force. It would enable manned and unmanned systems to cooperate effectively.
Didn't Boeing just propose a 6-gen Rhino-based aircraft? Boeing appears to be banking on that if the F-35C 'fails' they might get called upon.
The main reason why the X-35 was chosen over the X-32 was the uncertain future of the F-22, since the X-35 was more of a fighter than the pure fighterbomber X-32.
Carrier-borne NavAir has to fight against irrelevance on several fronts, but not because it is not needed, sea-based aviation is vital
But because in its current form - supercarriers - it might be forced away from the shores by AShM, might not survive the sub threat, and because the number of CVN might go down to eight for financial reasons, and finally the USN might be on the wrong track with the supercarrier at all, as in 20 years a larger force (24) of medium-sized carriers operating in groups might be the answer to survivability and flexibility.
I think what the JSF programme could use another year or two of hard thinking and development whether the B version should be done at all, and whether the JSF shouldn't be standardized on an evolved (towards more fighter and a little less fighterbomber) C version. There is no real hurry! Just build a couple more Super Hornets.
Since the JSF was decided upon and awarded, the situation of tactical aviation has changed. And in a real conflict the F-35 might have to do a lot more of the F-22 spectrum than anticipated. And a more fighter-like F-35, let's call it E version (plus a twin-seater F version) might also give the carrier-Navy a fighter and an early answer to F/A-XX, and USAF a way out of the low numbers of F-22s.
Know it won't happen, but it might be the right thing to do.
Cause for the Navy it might well be, that they never again fly a "fighter". Can't look 20 years ahead, but it's hard to see F/A-XX materializing as a brand new and Navy-exclusive platform.
Actually there is another aircraft that could fill the needs of the Navy. That would be the French Rafale F3. With two engines, and two seats (B version) they meet all the US Navy requirements today! The word on the street is that the US pilots that have worked with the French during Rafale landings aboard US Carriers have been greatly impressed.Imagine a Rafale with a US made AESA radar?
RSF
RSF,
That'd be hilarious. Just think, the French took the same set of engines as F-18, w/ a similar number of hardpoints & weapon load requirements, and built a more maneuverable fighter out of it than Boeing did!
Which brings up the point: Can Boeing radically alter the F-18 airframe to make it a better fighter?
I have to disagree on the non-need for the F/A-XX; in my view, not only does the Navy need it, the USAF needs it too. My reasoning here is that, as good as the F-22 is, it's not a solution for our fighter problems because it's too expensive. USAF will never see more than the current planned 183 plane buy. A fighter at 140+ million apiece (and that's flyaway cost, friends) simply isn't affordable, even to the riches superpower on earth.
JSF isn't a solution here, because in many ways, it's a less capable fighter than the birds it's replacing. In terms of pure fighter performance, the F-16 will eat it's lunch. JSF isn't a fighter first... it's a small stealth bomber that happens to have the ability to defend itself in a dogfight. The reason the Navy isn't terribly enamored with it is that it's essentially a one-trick pony with low performance. Only USMC seems to be really excited about it, because the Harrier is the only one of the aircraft that it'll replace where there will be a genuinely large improvement in performance.
What we need... USAF and Navy alike... is a real air superiority fighter that can take on current and projected top threats, and be made affordably. If the F/A-XX is nothing but another bomber, the Navy shouldn't even bother. Any plane with sufficient range can do the strike mission now that we're in the era of precision guided bombs. We rarely drop more than a pair of them in actual combat now. We need a real fighter that we can afford, and we need it badly. The Raptor costs too much, and the Super Hornet is one big compromise.
So many mistaken assumptions, it's hard to know where to begin...
1. The deck-skew towards family model Super Bugs is based on sopping the ex-F-14 community. With them gone, any single-seat hump with a 1760 bus, datalink and GPS receiver can drop IAMs.
2. OAF is ancient history. What OEF/OIF prove is that without FFAC/SCR based platforms to do the forward target routing after the E-3 screws up the funnel, your strike flow is going to be so much wasted gas trying to find targets. And with weapons like GBU-39, that may be the case anyway (tanking, tanking, tanking!).
3. The reason why the F-18F will not get a green light is because it's best use is in supporting REMOTE APERTURE UCAVs using the XTRA conformal smart skin radar and whatever EOTS++ FLIR is out there. You bring UCAS aboard as an F/A-18 replacement and the F-35 becomes an A-6E replacement in a 'heavy, all signals' environment. And it's just not good enough enough with 'both bombs today' compared to what a natural LO (no tails, no hogs nose, upper deck inlet) UCAV can achieve.
4. While OEF had some missions in the 12-15hr category, and with platforms like the 18G restricted to Mach .9 anyway, it's the lag in coverage between raid windows as much -as transit times- that counts as much as actual (fixed) munitions on target. In AfG they were initially looking at 11hr response times and 17hrs or more if you weren't in the fraglist. And that's just ridiculous for a raggedy ass sitting his bum on a mountain top with a mortar or an RCL shooting up your guys. He'll have a kid and be sending him to war by the time you get there.
5. The UCAV was officially spec'd to an 1,100nm @ 2hr hold capability. To run that kind of op in a Super Hornet would require about 40% of your effective sortie generation being whaled up and require 12+ hours to execute. Which would require a TRIPLED manning ration if you intended to do it again as soon as you got back because those puppies would be worthless for more than mission planning the next day. Without the CSA or some form of JRA shirtsleeves equivalent, your ability to support the UCAV as an in-theater as much as 'in the loop' military platform is minimal and the USN command hierarchy will resist strenuously being reduced to just another bunch of contract air services personnel at a mobile airport.
6. Supersonics to radius is not impossible. It just requires you remove all the draggy crap associated with manning up the fighter mission as in canopies, supersonic inlets, 9G structural ratings and hogsnose inlets. The French are getting there with a recce drone called 'slow/fast'. There are other payoffs to SSC in that, if Stealth is high enough, particularly that a single tanker supporting a single profile can push through sections of F-22 type airframes much more regularly at a much longer radius. If it takes you 3-4hrs to do a D1R1 mission set with 1/10th the support aircraft instead you obviously get more total dimpys per day than you do with a 10hr transit mission.
7. Anyone who has discredited the Super Hornet's 'dogfight' capabilities has failed to understand that, amongst first-tier players, all AAW is supersonic and above 25K where the BVR long pole is smack-your-teeth longest. Fit the AIM-120D or BVRAAM and recheck your figures as the APG-79 is really pretty good.
8. MFFC or 'Shooter Illuminator' is dependent on two things: A. The ability to support datalink shots with RTIP technology inserts into an AESA E-steer beamforming architecture. ADS-18 on the Hummer is not it. Wedgetail might be. B. Put the hounds ahead of the hunters. Here the F-35 is always going to be crippled by it's restricted internal carriage and so is the F/A-18 as long as you expect it to be multirole configured and/or operate in a 4th Gen SAM environment. That targeting pod on an MRM station with the outboards sterilized by carriage concerns and no Tip-AMRAAM is what makes ALL the Hornets so much junk.
Switch to a UCAS with a single weapons bay configureable to say 4 LRM or 2 LRM + BRU-61 ala the Raptor and you get both the signature control and the weapons load options while using your UCAV as little more than a weapons cabinet. The difference being that it can stick around long enough to cover multiple raids. The big problem here is not fighter performance it is fighter _signature_ which could compromise BVR, eventually.
9. If I was going to take another look at the whole bloody mess of 'fly 70%, maneuver 20%, prosecute 10%' that is offensive counter air, as a useless sortie vamp, I would start with the weapons and do what the Israeli's did with SEAD: Namely pull the rocket and add a turbine plus two seeker modes so that while the weapon remains expensive, at least you aren't lobbing them like a blindman pitching solid gold horseshoes.
We already know that a modern missile, in-envelope, will out turn any subsonic = 'dogfighting' jet. ANY jet. That is where your maneuver threshold should begin and end. What we fail to realize is that a cointoss at 60nm BVR which misses is a guarantee of another 20+ threat closure before the followup. Assuming you can see it. And even the Soviets are surely not so /stupid/ as to stick with a 5m2 Flanker target forever.
OTOH, if you fire off a 230nm ranged, 300lb, MALD/MALI at 100nm it will fly out over the enemy airbase and SIT THERE, looking for an optical track, on whatever is stupid enough to go wheels in well. It will then have a Mach 1.4 signature mimic (it was designed to match the Raptor after all) with which to pursue and if it misses the first time, it or it's pack buddy will come around again.
10. We are really well and truly dragging our feet on DEWS. Principally because they will mean the KT Boundary equivalent to the use of expeditionary airpower. Lasers won't miss. They can't be jammed. And in the 1MW class of an ABL, they potentially have the ability to reach out to a 1,000km at altitude. All's you need to do is change the LANTIRN to something more like the AOA or Cobra Ball and you have the worlds greatest air supremacy fighter as an 800,000lb, four engine, airliner.
This applies equally to assumptions about missiles and standoff and deckloads. Airborne ASW is worthless when the enemy is firing Alpha/Brahmos class, mixed trajectory weapons. Or SCTs. The only thing that can vet that kind of sea space is preemptive drone, portable SOSUS and longline replacements around a fixed COEA.
Similarly, with the paucity of ASST abilities (ROTHR as Jindalee, copied by the Chinese) and the standoff enabled by the use of UCAVs, it makes sense that the next generation of threat missiles will be guided aeroballistics that either bus short or MARV out for terminals. Nothing else makes sense, again because of the transit window problem on subsonics.
11. Of course the JSF is worthless as a fighter, the USAF designed it to be that way, just like they designed the F-16. I mean, fully kitted out for strike, you have similar (military) T/Wrs of about .5 and unlike the Viper, the JSF can't drop bags of gas and hope for a hail mary on a tanker. Nor would it want to on the wrong end of a 700nm radius.
Add to this the deep well is not AMRAAM compatible and an F-15 sized wingarea (the USN should have accepted reduced observables and gone double slotted here) on an F-16 airframe with resultant area rule effects of 'turn it sideways, it might be faster' and you just don't have a workable solution for the EM mechanics of conventional AAW metric. I mean what /idiot/ is going to take a 130 million dollar asset into a WVR fight with 20,000lbs of gas and no DIRCM anyway?
12. What you do have, in the F-35B, is a coupled shaft drive capable of providing considerably more than 80KVA output. While I am generally against the mess that STOVL makes on a CVTOL big deck, the reality remains that if the USN wanted a 'superior air to air fighter' they could do worse than to put a chemical loop in the belly, keep the big-wing for gas and palletize a laser installation for later upgrade to diode. While it wouldn't match the ABL by a long ways (why should it when SeaLite has been around as a concept for ages and we now have HAEUAVs for OTH relay) it could easily match the 100KW of an ATL. And that too gives you a pre-merge, 4-5 shot solution to AAW that is beyond anything likely to be needed in the next 10-20 years.
CONCLUSION:
I am profoundly against the massive anti deficiency act FRAUD that an original 27-35 million dollar fighter program, not in the 112-115 and climbing for orbit, F-35 program represents. I think that it represents a deliberate play for job security by an armed force that is afraid of the very modernization it insists it needs. And as three airplanes sharing one design name, I think it is always going to be price crippled as an export cash cow by the need to bear the cost of the least produced, most expensive, variants.
As a 10 aircraft squadron on a deck which currently only has four such, the F-35C is particularly wasteful because you cannot bring the large, external carriage, DEAD, EA and AAW munitions that are needed to penetrate _both bombs today_ worth of JSF IAM carriage. We don't need a stealth A-6E which outranges it's escorts. But at the same time, we don't need to return to the 1970s concept of huge airwing tails for multiple platforms.
What we need to do is standardize on a select PAIR of airframes, one of which, by Congressional Decree (1/3rd of all strike assets shall be unmanned by 2010) should be a robot. Once we have chosen our two, we can talk about the costs of decoupling the F-35C from the JSF program and shutting it down. Vs. keeping it as a modified air to air warfare (DEWS) platform. As well as how we plan to control robotic assets doing wide area NTISR using a limited fleet of ACS capable drone controllers. As an alternative to moving drone control off deck into a USAF airliner, into a JRA-as-CSA followon, or out of theater entirely.
When we see 30 and 50 thousand job cuts in primary civilian industries which actually DO SOMETHING USEFUL in a market for which China is a rising consumer in automobile production, it is not our right to conserve military turf as manned union voting block. Not when we are looking at a 300-325 billion dollar program costs. Not when the military didn't have the right mix of answers to win a simple war in Iraq where unmanned assets proved to be the most valuable tacair platforms we had.
Welcome back Kurt. Welcome back. Thanks for stopping by. Hope to see you around more.
Eric
I second that. Kurt, we missed you.
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